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REWRITING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE FOR
ONE NATION UNDER (A) GOD
Steven G. Gey*
I. INTRODUCTION
Here is one of the safest predictions in the realm of constitutional law: The
departures of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and Chief Justice William Rehnquist from
the United States Supreme Court will inaugurate a new era of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. In some areas-such as those relating to the indirect government
financing of religious enterprisesI-this new era has already begun. In these areas, the
two new appointees by President George W. Bush will almost certainly consolidate a
jurisprudence that the Court's conservative majority has already developed, and is
applying aggressively, to change the rules that had governed these matters for the
previous four decades.2  In other areas of church/state jurisprudence-such as the
jurisprudence pertaining to the government's symbolic endorsement of religion-Justice
O'Connor's resignation will likely signal the Court's abandonment of a separationist
mandate that has been enforced with surprising consistency (especially in the public
schools 3) for over forty years.
The leitmotif of the Court's new constitutional church/state jurisprudence will be
(to borrow the notorious phrase from one of the more heated recent controversies in this
area) that this is "one nation under God.' 4 The only real uncertainty is in the degree of
the new Court's commitment to allowing the country's religious majority to wield its
political power in sectarian ways. It is not yet clear how much the new Court will permit
the political majority to use its control over the government to finance religious
enterprises, or to infuse the government with religious dogmas and symbols. On the
* David and Deborah Fonvielle and Donald and Janet Hinkle Professor of Law, Florida State University
College of Law. J.D., Columbia University; B.A., Eckerd College.
1. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding voucher program, under which
government money is given to students attending religious schools).
2. For the theory of government financing prior to Zelman, see Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
(articulating a no-aid principle).
3. See e.g. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (prohibiting state-sanctioned prayer at
public school football games); Epperson v. Ark., 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (holding unconstitutional a state statute
prohibiting the teaching of evolution in public schools); Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding unconstitutional state-authorized Bible reading in public schools); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding unconstitutional state-mandated prayer in public schools).
4. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (challenging the recitation in a public
school of the language "under God" in the official Pledge of Allegiance).
1
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other hand, it is not at all difficult to describe the analytic tools that the new Court will
rapidly jettison. In particular, the new Court is likely to abandon any pretense of
pursuing Thomas Jefferson's and James Madison's principle of separation of church and
state. In the new era, the Court is likely to follow Justice Scalia (who is in many ways
the spiritual leader of the new Court) in rejecting the "demonstrably false principle that
the government cannot favor religion over irreligion."
5
In the new Establishment Clause era, church and state will be fellow travelers on a
journey to a common destination defined by the higher morality of the religious majority.
In the new constitutional order, the Establishment Clause will be reconfigured to permit
the government to use religion as an "important unifying mechanism" 6 for its citizens,
which will reflect the spiritual dictates of the "God whom they all worship and seek.",7 It
remains to be seen what protections will linger for those who do not wish to partake of
the government's efforts to achieve religious unity. Justice Scalia has at least conceded
that religious dissenters retain' certain protections under the Free Exercise Clause,8 and
for that reason dissenters apparently could not legally be forced to express publicly
religious beliefs they do not hold. Also, the Court's new majority may not yet have the
necessary fifth vote to permit government to infuse the public schools with the same
unifying religiosity that will apparently now be de rigueur in the rest of society, since
Justice Kennedy has in recent years been uncomfortable with the coercive overtones of
government-sanctioned religious exultations in the public schools. 9 But putting aside the
issue of religion in public schools and state-mandated religious observance, it is not clear
that much will remain of the First Amendment's prohibition of laws "respecting an
establishment of religion."
The purpose of this article is to describe the parameters of the new Establishment
Clause by predicting what will be left of the Establishment Clause a decade from now.
The basic question is this: In a constitutional regime that permits the government to
overtly favor certain religions and subtly afford preferred political status to the adherents
of those favored religions, what content remains in the First Amendment's prohibition of
laws respecting an establishment of religion? In the spirit of this symposium, the inquiry
into the new Establishment Clause regime will also address the role of future Nadine
Strossens and other civil libertarians, whose predecessors fought, and won, numerous
major battles for religious liberty during the last six decades, the product of which the
Court is now prepared to quickly dismantle.
The discussion of these issues will proceed in three parts. The first part will
compare the current Establishment Clause paradigm with its apparent successor,
focusing particularly on the two paradigms' very different understanding of the role of
5. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2752 (2005) (Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, JJ. &
Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
6. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 646 (1992) (Scalia, White, Thomas, JJ. & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
7. Id.
8. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2756 ("The beliefs of those citizens [who do not belong to monotheistic
religions] are entirely protected by the Free Exercise Clause.").
9. See Lee, 505 U.S. 577, in which Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion striking down a prayer at a
public school graduation ceremony, and Santa Fe Independent School District, 530 U.S. 290, in which Justice
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religion in democratic governance. The second part will describe the doctrinal
implications of the new Establishment Clause paradigm, focusing on the standards
pertaining to government financing of religious enterprises, government endorsement of
religious symbols and dogma, and the role of religion in public education. The third part
will address the possibility that civil libertarians can propose principles that can
effectively limit the damage to religious liberty that will be inflicted by the Court's
wholesale abandonment of the separationist constitutional ideal.
II. THE CURRENT AND NEW ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE PARADIGMS
Although the Supreme Court started aggressively enforcing the Establishment
Clause over sixty years ago,10 it has not always provided the lower courts with clear
guidance on how to apply the Clause to particular circumstances. In retrospect, however,
although the results of the Court's Establishment Clause cases have often been confused
and even contradictory, the theory of the Establishment Clause articulated by the Court
has been remarkably consistent. Ever since it entered the church/state arena, the
Supreme Court has embraced a paradigm that describes in fairly specific ways the proper
role of religion in a diverse democracy. At least at the theoretical level, the Court has
followed this approach ever since 1947, when it issued its first major Establishment
Clause decision in Everson v. Board of Education. 1  The Court outlined its theoretical
approach in a famous quote in Everson, which is one of the most frequently cited
passages from the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly
or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.
In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended
to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."'
12
Embedded in this quote are the seeds of the traditional paradigm the Court has
followed for over a half-century, a paradigm the Court's new majority now seems likely
to abandon. The Court's traditional paradigm includes four basic principles: first, it is
improper for the government to either favor or punish religious belief or practice unless a
practice causes some religiously-neutral harm; second, religion is irrelevant to the
allocation of the rights and obligations of citizenship; third, religion is inherently an
10. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 7-8 (announcing that the Establishment Clause is incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and describing the principles guiding the non-establishment
mandate).
11. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
12. Id. at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
2006]
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individual, not a collective phenomenon; and fourth, religious liberty is defined by a
national, not a local standard. 13 When read together, these four principles described a
very strongly separationist framework, under which the government and religion
operated in almost wholly separate spheres. Throughout the years following Everson, a
strong majority on the Court steadfastly purported to pursue the separationist norm,
although it often fell short of enforcing that norm effectively when confronted with
actual disputes over the proper relationship of religion and the government. This norm is
now under systematic attack, although the opponents of the traditional paradigm have not
yet described the full implications of their new theory of church and state. The purpose
of this section is to describe the components of the new Establishment Clause paradigm,
and contrast it to the theory that has guided relationships between church and state for
over a half century.
A. The Current Establishment Clause Paradigm
Although the four principles that define the traditional Establishment Clause
paradigm relate to different aspects of religious liberty, each of these principles are
indispensable components of the Court's modem approach to church/state issues.
Remove even one of these components, and it becomes difficult to explain much ofwhat
the Court has said about church and state in the last six decades.
1. Principle One: The Neutrality and Non-coercion Mandates
The first component of the current paradigm prohibits the government from
favoring a particular religious group or religion in general, and likewise prohibits
government from punishing religious (or irreligious) belief or practice, unless the
practice causes some religiously-neutral harm. In its most basic form, this principle
prohibits all forms of governmental coercion relating to religion. This is the narrowest
aspect of the current paradigm, and the one that most directly protects particular
manifestations of religious liberty. The prohibition of governmental coercion is by no
means the end of the Establishment Clause story. Since it first began enforcing the
Establishment Clause, the Court has emphasized repeatedly that coercion is not a
necessary element of an Establishment Clause violation. 14 Nevertheless, the Court has
also repeatedly recognized that a government action coercing religious belief or practice
constitutes a quintessential violation of the First Amendment: "It is beyond dispute that,
at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to
support or participate in religion or its exercise." 15
In its modem Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the Court has addressed the
problem of religious coercion in two ways: first, by prohibiting (at least in theory) all
13. Id.
14. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 430 ("The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not
depend upon any showing of direct government compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which
establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not.");
see also Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Relig. Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 786 (1973) (same); Schempp,
374 U.S. at 223 (same).
15. Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.
[Vol. 41:737
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forms of government financial support for religious enterprises, and second, by
prohibiting government sponsorship of religious exercises or symbols, especially in
schools.
The element of coercion has been one of the Court's primary focal points in its
cases dealing with government financing of religious organizations. In this respect, the
Court has carried forward the primary focus of the debates over church and state at the
time the Constitution was framed. Like Madison, the modern Court's focus has been on
the coercion of taxpayers, which is inherent in the act of government taxation for the
benefit of religious organizations. The Madisonian notion that religious liberty is
violated by the allocation to religious organizations of even "three pence" 16 of tax
revenues is the purest example of this approach.
17
The inconsistent application of this "three pence" principle has been the most
obvious blemish on the Court's efforts to enforce the traditional paradigm of its
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. In cases involving direct government aid to
religion, the Court has adhered to the tax-as-coercion principle fairly consistently,
because Justice O'Connor has refused to join the other religious accommodationists on
the Court in abandoning the rule that the government may not directly fund the
specifically religious component of religious enterprises. 18  Despite the Court's
unbending insistence on adherence to the principle, however, during the modern era the
Court often has been willing to bend the rule to approve a wide range of financial
incentives and indirect government benefits to religious organizations and enterprises. In
Everson, for example, the Court approved a program under which the State would pay
for the transportation of children to pervasively sectarian religious schools. 19 Likewise,
in Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York, 20 the Court approved the
widespread practice of granting churches tax exemptions and waivers-a practice that
even in the early 1970s produced tax expenditures for churches benefits worth many
billions of dollars. 2 1 More recently, the Court held that the Establishment Clause did not
prohibit state funding of a student attending a Christian college to train for a religious
career,22 and upheld a state program providing tax deductions for tuition payments,
which went overwhelmingly to parents of children in religious schools.
23
16. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785) (reprinted in
Everson, 330 U.S. at app., 65 (Rutledge, Frankfurter, Jackson & Burton, JJ., dissenting)).
17. Id. at app., 65-66 ("Who does not see that the same authority which ... can force a citizen to contribute
three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any
other establishment in all cases whatsoever?").
18. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). In Mitchell, O'Connor commented:
I... disagree with the plurality's conclusion that actual diversion of government aid to religious
indoctrination is consistent with the Establishment Clause. Although "[o]ur cases have permitted
some government funding of secular functions performed by sectarian organizations," our decisions
"provide no precedent for the use of public funds to finance religious activities."
Id. at 840 (O'Connor & Breyer, JJ., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted, bracket in original).
19. 330 U.S. at 3 (describing New Jersey's program for transporting children to parochial schools).
20. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
21. Id. at 714-15 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (describing the value of tax exemptions to churches).
22. Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
23. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding a state program providing tax exemptions for
educational expenses including tuition); id. at 405 (Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., dissenting)
2006]
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In its tax exemption and indirect aid cases the Court has attempted to avoid the
coercion principle by reference to the constitutional mandate of neutrality and
nondiscrimination. 24 According to the Court, tax exemption and indirect aid programs
were permissible under the Establishment Clause because the programs were neutral and
nondiscriminatory in the sense that the benefits were available to all organizations
engaged in similar activities, regardless of their religious nature or affiliation.25  The
Court has even suggested that the absence of aid programs might evidence government
hostility toward religious entities.2 6 The problem with this argument is that it has no
stopping point short of a uniform approval of all government programs aiding religion-
so long as those programs include (at least as a hypothetical matter) the nonreligious as
well as the religious among the potential beneficiaries. Later generations of
conservatives on the Court have taken these concepts of neutrality and nondiscrimination
and used them to eviscerate the core principle that the concepts were originally offered to
support-i.e., the principle that the government should not use its coercive authority to
support religion. 2 7  As discussed in the next section, what were originally ancillary
arguments have now become the core of the new paradigm under which the government
may use its taxing and spending authority to support the sectarian components of
religious enterprises.
2 8
In addition to the problem of coercion in the financing of religion, the Court's
modem church/state jurisprudence has also addressed coercion in the context of cases
involving the infusion of religion in governmental symbols and activities. In the public
school context, the Court has been vigilant in enforcing the no-coercion principle. In the
school context, the Court interprets the concept of coercion very broadly. In this milieu,
the concept of coercion covers both government actions that directly coerce religious
practice, as well as government actions that provide a forum in which the religious
majority may apply social pressure to religious dissenters.
The undeniable fact is that the school district's supervision and control of a high school
graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students
to stand as a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence during the invocation and
benediction. This pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any
overt compulsion.
29
(noting that over 95% of students attending schools charging tuition attended religious schools).
24. See e.g. id. at 398-99 ("[A] program ... that neutrally provides state assistance to a broad spectrum of
citizens is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause.").
25. See e.g. id. (emphasizing the neutrality of a tax deduction program); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,
274 (1981) (upholding a program granting religious groups access to public facilities on the ground that the
facilities were "available to a broad class of nonreligious as well as religious speakers"); Walz, 397 U.S. at 669
(upholding tax deductions to churches on the ground that the program was characterized by a "benevolent
neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference").
26. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 (noting difficulties church schools would encounter in the absence of
state-funded transportation of religious school students, and concluding that the First Amendment "requires the
state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the
state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to
favor them.").
27. See infra nn. 76-90 and accompanying text.
28. Id.
29. Lee, 505 U.S. at 593.
[Vol. 41:737
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This broad conception of coercion is not a recent phenomenon. Even the earliest
of the Court's school prayer decisions did not involve classic coercion-i.e., mandatory
participation in religious practices with which the student disagrees. Although the first
school prayer decision did involve a state mandate for the inclusion of a state-authored
prayer in every class, that mandate allowed dissenting students to leave the classroom
during the religious exercise. 30  Thus, technically speaking, no one was ever truly
coerced into participating in a religious exercise with which they disagreed.
Nevertheless, the Court rejected the State's claim that the exercise was voluntary and did
not interfere with the dissenting students' religious liberty.3 1 The Court has adhered to
the coercive-context approach to school religious exercises ever since Engel. In the most
recent example of this phenomenon, the Court rejected a Texas school board's argument
that a religious exercise at a public school football game was not attributable to the state
and therefore did not violate the First Amendment if a "circuit-breaker" 32 was introduced
into the system under which students could vote to authorize the religious exercise.33
The Court ruled that the context itself provided the constitutionally significant coercive
element, since the inclusion of the religious exercise required the dissenting students to
either accede to the prayer or risk social ostracism in order to participate in an officially
sponsored event.
34
The Court has been remarkably consistent in applying the neutrality and
anti-coercion mandates in the school cases. Outside the school context, however, as in
almost every other area of the Court's modem Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the
Court has applied its neutrality and anti-coercion mandates imperfectly. With regard to
the coerced accession to majority religious practices, the Court has been much less
vigilant in policing such coercive exercises with regard to adults than it has with regard
to school-age children. The Court has upheld the recitation of an officially sanctioned
prayer in a state legislature,3 5 and just last Term upheld (in at least some circumstances)
a state's erection of a monument containing explicitly religious dictates issued by "the
LORD thy God."3 6  The Court has also upheld several versions of holiday displays
containing overtly religious symbols.
3 7
But it is perhaps at least a backhanded testament to the importance of the first
element of the current paradigm that in each of these cases the Court had to construct an
elaborate pretense that the government was in no way endorsing the religious symbol,
and that there was no actual coercion of religious dissenters. In these cases the Justices
30. Engel, 370 U.S. at 423 (noting that children or their parents could avoid the official prayers if they did
not want to participate).
31. Id. at 431 (noting that "the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the
prevailing officially approved religion is plain").
32. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 305 (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 311-12.
35. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
36. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (upholding a monument containing one version of the
Ten Commandments on the lawn of the Texas State Capitol); id. at 2873 (Stevens & Ginsberg, JJ., dissenting)
(describing the inscription on the monument, which begins "I AM the LORD thy God").
37. See County ofAllegheney v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of an official
holiday display including a menorah outside a county building); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)
(holding that the Establishment Clause did not prohibit the erection of a creche as part a city's holiday display).
2006]
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who provided the crucial votes for the majority argued that various factual or historical
elements effectively negated any message of official endorsement of religion,3 8 and in
all the cases the Court argued that no one was coerced by the State's religious activity
because the activity would not be construed as an official endorsement of a particular
religious message. 39 The fact that in these cases the Court felt the need to explain away
coercion or endorsement as a factual matter (however implausibly) at least implicitly
recognized that as a legal matter coercion and official endorsement of religion remains
highly significant. Thus, the first principle remains intact even as the Court occasionally
averted its glance to violations of that principle.
2. Principle Two: The Irrelevance of Religion to Citizenship
In decisions involving classroom and graduation prayer, the Court's prohibition of
religious coercion operates to protect religious liberty directly by freeing religious
dissenters from being forced to participate unwillingly in the religious practices of the
religious majority. The Court's prohibition of religious coercion by the government has
another function, however-protect the public sector from the corruption that naturally
follows from the joinder of church and state. The theory here is not that religious ideas
are inherently pernicious or that churches are corrupt, but rather that the conjunction of
religion and political power undermines the proper functions of both the church and the
government. Joining church and state corrupts the church by shifting the institution's
focus from the salvation of adherents' souls, to the coercive regulation of nonadherents'
conduct, and corrupts the government by allowing political majorities to use their power
to interfere with the lives of dissenters in ways that are pernicious in a diverse
democracy. This corruption, in turn, leads to social division along religious lines, which
has the potential to destroy the entire political structure. As the Court once summarized
this point: "[P]olitical debate and division ... are normal and healthy manifestations of
our democratic system of government, but political division along religious lines was one
of the principal evils against which [the Religion Clauses were] intended to protect.
' 4 0
These assertions are neither radical nor new; they would be quite familiar to the author of
38. See County of Allegheney, 492 U.S. at 635 (O'Connor, Brennan & Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that by erecting a display including a menorah and a Christmas tree "the
city did not endorse Judaism or religion in general, but rather conveyed a message of pluralism and freedom of
belief during the holiday season"); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that "evident
purpose of including the cr&che in the larger display was not promotion of the religious content of the creche
but celebration of the public holiday through its traditional symbols," which did not convey an official
endorsement of religion); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 (arguing that the Founding Fathers "did not consider
[legislative] prayers as a proselytizing activity or as symbolically placing the government's 'official seal of
approval on one religious view').
39. County of Allegheney, 492 U.S. at 620 (noting the overall context of the menorah display and
concluding that "it is not 'sufficiently likely' that residents of Pittsburgh will perceive the combined display of
the tree, the sign, and the menorah as an 'endorsement' or 'disapproval ... of their individual religious
choices'" (ellipses in original)); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680 ("When viewed in the proper context of the Christmas
Holiday season, it is apparent that, on this record, there is insufficient evidence to establish that the inclusion of
the creche is a purposeful or surreptitious effort to express some kind of subtle governmental advocacy of a
particular religious message."); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 ("Here, the individual claiming injury by the practice is
an adult, presumably not readily susceptible to 'religious indoctrination' or peer pressure." (citations omitted)).
40. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
[Vol. 41:737
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the Establishment Clause.
4 1
In the traditional Establishment Clause paradigm, separation of church and state
prevents the corruption of both institutions by protecting each institution from the other.
To enforce the separationist ideal, participation in the political structure has to be
insulated from any suggestion that piety and fealty to religious ideals are a condition of
citizenship. Article VI of the Constitution enforces one aspect of this principle by
prohibiting religious tests as a qualification for office.4 2 The Court has reinforced this
direct protection against religious tests by interpreting the First Amendment as
prohibiting the "historically and constitutionally discredited policy of probing religious
beliefs by test oaths or limiting public offices to persons who have, or perhaps more
properly profess to have, a belief in some particular kind of religious concept.43
Although the protection against the direct conjoining of religion and citizenship is
important, in the modem era the threats to religious liberty and political participation
have come in more subtle forms. The Court has responded to these subtler threats by
going beyond the prohibition of religious tests to protect against indirect linkages of
religion and politics. Under the modem paradigm, the Court has done this in two ways.
First, the Court has required that all government actions and policies be motivated by a
secular purpose. This requirement is part of the so-called "Lemon test." This test was
derived from factors applied in a series of decisions in the 1960s, 44 which were compiled
into a three-part test in Lemon v. Kurtzman.4 5  Although subject to almost constant
critique from opponents of the separationist paradigm since its inception,4 6 the Lemon
test has been the defining feature of Establishment Clause jurisprudence for more than
three decades. The Lemon test requires every government action or legislation to have a
,41. Madison has commented:
During almost fifteen centuries, has the legal establishment of Christianity been on trial. What have
been its fruits? More or less in all places, pride and indolence in the Clergy; ignorance and servility
in the laity; in both, superstition, bigotry and persecution. Enquire of the Teachers of Christianity
for the ages in which it appeared in its greatest lustre; those of every sect, point to the ages prior to
its incorporation with Civil policy.
Madison, supra n. 16, at 7 (reprinted in Everson, 330 U.S. at app., 67-68 (Rutledge, Frankfurter, Jackson &
Burton, JJ., dissenting)).
42. U.S. Const. art. VI (stating "no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or
public trust under the United States").
43. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 494 (1961) (footnote omitted) (holding unconstitutional Maryland's
religious test for public office).
44. See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 106 (applying the secular purpose and effects test); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222
(same).
45. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
46. See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia &
Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment) (lamenting that Lemon had not been interred, and claiming that "Like
some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being
repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the
little children and school [board] attorneys."); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that the Lemon test "has no basis in the history of the [First Amendment] it seeks to
interpret, is difficult to apply and yields unprincipled results"). Even the author of the opinion that contained
the Lemon test tried to weaken the test by arguing that the three Lemon factors should not be rigorously
enforced, but "should rather be viewed as guidelines with which to identify instances in which the objectives of
the Religion Clauses have been impaired." Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971).
2006]
9
Gey: Rewriting the Establishment Clause for One Nation under (a) God
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2005
TULSA LAW REVIEW
secular purpose, a secular effect, and be free of extensive entanglements between church
and state.
47
For purposes of protecting against the linkage of political participation and
citizenship, the secular purpose requirement is the significant part of the Lemon test. The
secular purpose requirement essentially prohibits religious proponents from using the
government to enforce some aspect of their theological or moral agenda, unless the
proposed legislation or action also can be justified to nonadherents as advancing a
secular goal. This provides important protection for the political process, because it
structures political discussion in a manner that ensures that everyone in society can
participate, regardless of their different metaphysical points of view, religious
affiliations, and conceptions of ultimate goods. Political arguments (and their ultimate
legal products) must always be cast, to use John Rawls's terminology, in the form of
"public reason.' 4 8 These arguments and decisions must, in other words, be cast in terms
that are equally accessible to everyone in society. Assertions by the political majority
that "God said so, and therefore you must obey" are meaningless to those who do not
worship the same God or worship no God at all. Political discussions conducted on
those terms are therefore not discussions at all, but rather the raw exercise of political
muscle. Once a democracy reaches this stage, it has already evolved into another kind of
political animal. By requiring the government to explain all of its actions by reference to
a secular rationale, the Court has attempted to structure political discussions in a way that
avoids the disintegration of the democratic project.
The second way in which the Court has enforced the second principle of the
separationist paradigm is by prohibiting all government endorsements of religion. This
is one of Justice O'Connor's major contributions to modern Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, and she specifically based her endorsement analysis on the need to ensure
that everyone in society felt fully enfranchised without regard to their religious affiliation
or lack thereof. Justice O'Connor argued that the government should be prohibited from
endorsing religion because "[e]ndorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.
Disapproval sends the opposite message.''9 According to O'Connor, the government
may not "make religion relevant, in reality or public perception, to status in the political
community.'
50
The proposition that status in the political community should be unrelated to
religious affiliation seems unexceptionable, and indeed it is difficult to conceive of a
non-theocratic democracy that did not include some form of this constitutional
command. The devil, as usual, is in the details. Justice O'Connor, in particular, had a
47. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 ("First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, finally, the statute must not
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion."' (citations omitted)).
48. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 131-32 (Harv. U.
Press 1999).
49. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring). A portion of this passage is also quoted in Wallace,
472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
50. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692.
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difficult time reconciling her principle with her willingness to approve all manner of
subtle linkages between the majority's religious beliefs and the government. Justice
O'Connor not only approved of official religious displays, 5 1 she also spoke out in favor
of the religious component of the Pledge of Allegiance. 52 In that controversy, Justice
O'Connor came up with several reasons why urging public school children to pledge
allegiance to a nation "under God" did not violate the Establishment Clause. Many of
these reasons-such as the fact that instances of "ceremonial deism" 53 are ubiquitous
throughout the country's history54 -seem more like an obvious reason to overturn the
religious component of the Pledge than a reason to uphold it. In fact, these insignificant,
but omnipresent, instances of religiosity are precisely the sorts of official religious
endorsements that undermine the Court's attempt to sever the rights of citizenship from
the perception of mandatory obeisance to the majority's faith.
That the Court never realized the ideal of secularizing citizenship and political
participation, however, does not undercut the importance of articulating the principle
itself. The notion that the government must maintain an agnostic position with regard to
all religious ideas is central to the separationist ideal, and indeed central to the notion of
a religiously diverse democracy. Abandoning this principle in favor of an overtly
theocratic notion of citizenship is probably the single most important aspect of the shift
from the current Establishment Clause paradigm to the new.
3. Principle Three: Religion as a Private Affair
The third principle that characterizes the current Establishment Clause paradigm
follows naturally from the second. If, as posited by the second principle, citizenship is
not tied to religious faith or lack thereof, and if the government must remain agnostic
with regard to religion and must provide secular reasons for all its activities and policies,
then religion is by definition not part of the public sphere occupied by the fields of
politics and law. Under the current Establishment Clause paradigm, therefore, religion is
assigned to the private realm, where it is both protected from public (in all but
exceptional cases) and prohibited from using the apparatus of the state to advance its
goals. As the Court once summarized this point: "The Constitution decrees that religion
must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of
private choice."
55
This conception of religion is one of the most grating aspects of the current
paradigm to those who would abandon the Madisonian model of church/state relations.
According to critics of the separationist paradigm, the privatization of religion is a way
of rendering religion irrelevant in the world. Stephen Carter once famously maintained
that this approach to religion threatened to turn religious belief into "a kind of hobby:
something so private that it is as irrelevant to public life as the building of model
51. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 622-37 (O'Connor, Brennan & Stevens, JJ., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
52. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 33 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
53. Id. at 37 (internal quotation marks omitted).
54. Id.
55. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625.
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airplanes." 56 Others, such as Richard John Neuhaus, have equally famously argued that
leaving religion precepts and practitioners out of discourse over public policy effectively
creates a "naked public square," 57 in which the Court has "systematically excluded from
policy consideration the operative values of the American people, values that are
overwhelmingly grounded in religious belief.",58 In a more subtle vein, Richard Garnett
has recently argued that it is inaccurate to argue that religion belongs entirely in the
private sector because "the content of religious doctrine and the trajectory of its
development might instead be matters to which even a liberal, secular, and democratic
state reasonably could, and perhaps should, attend."
59
The current paradigm rejects all of these claims. It would take an entire article to
fully explore the debate over the principle that government should be completely a
purely secular institution and religion should be an entirely private affair. For present
purposes, the basic dispute can be summarized as relating to three matters: disagreements
about the nature of religious concerns, disagreements about the relationship of religious
morality and public policy, and disagreements about the effects on religion of the secular
government model.
With regard to the proper scope of religious concerns, the current Establishment
Clause paradigm is in no way intended to diminish the importance or influence of
religion in modem affairs. The modem paradigm does, however, assume that the
primary concern of religion will be different from the primary concems of government.
Under the modem paradigm, government and religion operate in different realms. The
modem paradigm allocates temporal matters to the government, and reserves eternal
matters to religion. Spirituality, eternal salvation, metaphysics, and sin are simply not
matters that can be addressed coherently by collective political bodies in a country as
diverse as this one. These are not matters that can be debated with the intent of
reconciling differences in a manner that can lead to policies that can be enforced by law.
Any attempt to address these matters through politics will lead to divisiveness, social
dislocation, and (eventually) the blunt assertion of power by the religious faction that
dominates the political majority. The modem paradigm takes the reality that different
religious approaches will never be reconciled through politics or law, and forecloses the
effort from the outset.
None of this means that religion is irrelevant, or a "hobby," or doomed to
disappear into social irrelevance. Under the modem paradigm, religion is intended to
thrive (and, judging from the vibrant religious culture that characterizes the United
States, the modem paradigm has realized this objective). Matters of personal spirituality
and the eternal questions of life and death do not become less important if they are
addressed in the private sector, away from the crass machinations of the political culture.
Nor, for that matter, does religion become ultimately irrelevant in political debates.
56. Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987 Duke L.J. 977,
978 (1987).
57. Richard John Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America 37 (2d ed.,
Wn. B. Eerdmans Pubig. Co. 1984).
58. Id.
59. Richard W. Garnett, Assimilation, Toleration, and the State's Interest in the Development of Religious
Doctrine, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 1645, 1649 (2004).
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As Neuhaus and others have argued, the personal values arising from religious faith will
inform the political positions of adherents. Nothing in the modem paradigm would
prevent this from occurring. All that is required under the modem paradigm is that
religious adherents accept from the outset that they are part of a culture in which
everyone has the same right to decide ultimate questions free of political coercion.
Private morality cannot be translated into public policy unless some explanation can be
given that comports with the spiritually diverse nature-of the culture. Certain issues are
taken off the table in a constitutional democracy, because otherwise, everyone would
have to fight to the death to take control of the table.
60
Finally, proponents of the modem Establishment Clause paradigm do not agree
with the routine allegation that the privatization of religion is bad for religion. Religion
and religious adherents are protected in numerous ways by a constitutional regime in
which government must stand aside from religious matters. The religious views and
practices of those who do not belong to the dominant faith are protected because the
religious and political majority cannot force them to adhere to the precepts of the
dominant faith. Under the modem paradigm, members of the majority cannot use their
control over the public schools as a means of converting the children of religious
dissenters. And, under the modem paradigm, religious institutions are allowed to
conduct their internal operations virtually unregulated by the govemment. 6 1 Religious
institutions get political insulation and independence in exchange for giving up the right
to use the government for their sectarian ends. The only logical opposition to a secular
regime in which religious minorities and dissenters are protected from the consequences
of political powerlessness, would come from members of a sect who believe, in the face
of all historical evidence to the contrary, that their particular sect will dominate the
culture forever.
4. Principle Four: Religious Liberty as a Matter of National Concern
The final component of the modem Establishment Clause paradigm is the principle
that religious liberty is a constitutionally protected component of civic nationalism.
According to this principle, religious liberty is a function of membership in a
presumptively diverse national political culture, regardless of the fact that many citizens
60. This also answers Professor Garnett's argument that the government is, and should be, concerned and
directly involved with the direction of religious doctrine. The examples he cites for this proposition include
things like antidiscrimination laws, the criminalization of polygamy, laws preventing sexual abuse of minors,
and state actions intended to encourage the development of "moderate" versions of Islam. Id. at 1678-82.
These examples arguably do not involve religious doctrine at all, as that term is understood in light of the
modem Establishment Clause paradigm. Rather, these examples involve the epiphenomena of religion-social
implications of religious doctrine, which have consequences beyond the community of the faithful. Insofar as
religious doctrine has implications in the broader society, government will necessarily become involved to
protect others from antagonistic actions motivated by religious faith. But there is an important difference
between controlling actions based on religion, and attempting to intervene in the development and
dissemination of the religious doctrine itself. It is one thing to say that the government can act to prevent a
religious fundamentalist from sect X from blowing up a building to kill adherents of sect Y; it is quite another
to say that religious fundamentalists from sect X may not believe (and openly teach) that adherents of sect Y
are going to hell.
61. See Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Meml. Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440 (1969) (holding the courts are prohibited from adjudicating ecclesiastical disputes among
church members); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 735 (1871) (same).
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may live in religiously homogeneous localities. In one sense, this principle is merely a
natural consequence of the incorporation of the First Amendment into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 62 which subjects local government actions
affecting religious liberty to national rules, but the implications of religious
demographics make the incorporation of the Establishment Clause even more crucial
than the nationalization of some other components of the Bill of Rights.
The presumption of religious nationalism will have a greater impact in some areas
of the country than it will in others. In many areas of the country, the Establishment
Clause is merely a constitutional backstop to the natural checks and balances of the
political process. In many major urban centers, for example, the melting pot is a
demographic reality and many different cultures coexist easily. In these areas, no one
religious sect is likely to use the government to impose its symbols, ideals, and sectarian
moral precepts on everyone else because no sect can muster the kind of unchecked
political power that would be necessary to achieve that objective.
Outside of major urban centers in cosmopolitan states, however, the reality of
religious demographics tends to be very different. In many states, one sect dominates the
culture to such an extent that in the absence of constitutional constraints, no political
check would stop the dominant sect from imposing its values in virtually every aspect of
life-especially in the public schools, and government symbols and activities. It is
impossible to calculate precisely how much of the country would be susceptible to this
extent of religious dominance. The best statistics are available on a statewide basis.
Even if one considers only the religious demographics of entire states (as opposed to
particular areas within states), religious dominance is a real concern in a significant part
of the country. It would seem that approximately 30% of the country is characterized by
the kind of sectarian domination that could lead the dominant sect to exercise unchecked
political power in the absence of constitutional constraints. 63 The phenomenon of local
62. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 7-8 (noting the incorporation of the Establishment Clause into the Fourteenth
Amendment).
63. This estimate is based on the statistics compiled in a recent study published by the Graduate Center of
the City University of New York. Barry A. Kosmin, Egon Mayer & Ariela Keysar, American Religious
Identification Survey, http://www.gc.cuny.edu/faculty/research briefs/aris/aris index.htm (last accessed Jan.
29, 2006) [hereinafter ARIS Survey]. I am defining "sectarian domination" to include states in which more than
35% of the population identifies with one sect, and no other sect has identification rates that come within
twenty percentage points of the dominant sect. Using this definition, according to the ARIS Survey, fifteen may
be described as subject to sectarian domination. Id. at ex. 15, http://www.gc.cuny.edu/faculty/research-briefs/
aris/key findings.htm (compiling religious identification statistics for forty-eight states and the District of
Columbia, excluding Hawaii and Alaska for reasons of cost). These states include Alabama, Arkansas,
Georgia, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, and Vermont. Id. Other factors mitigate the influence of the
dominant sect in some of the non-southem states. In Vermont, for example, 38% of the population identifies
itself as Catholic, while only 6% of the population identifies with the next largest sect
(Congregationalist/United Church of Christ). Id. This domination is mitigated by the fact that an
extraordinarily large percentage of the population within Vermont (22%) identifies itself as "nonreligious,"
which will probably serve as something of a check on the activities of the dominant religious sect. Id. A
similar phenomenon limits the influence of the dominant Catholic population in New York and New Jersey,
both of which are nonreligious and non-Christian populations. ARIS Survey, supra, at ex. 15,
http://www.gc.cuny.edu/faculty/researchbriefs/aris/keyfindings.htm.
On the other hand, many states that fall short of satisfying the criteria as subject to "sectarian
domination" may well fit the definition in actuality. In Kentucky, for example, the dominant Baptists represent
33% of the population (short of the 35% line that demarcates domination), but the nonreligious and Catholic
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sectarian domination may be more extensive than the statewide statistics indicate.
In many states that appear religiously diverse, the diversity may be centered in the state's
urban centers, with concentrations of sects in outlying rural and exurban areas.
Local or regional sectarian domination has serious implications for religious
liberty. Individuals who belong to vastly underrepresented religious sects-or who
choose not to be religious at all-already have to face the possibility of ostracism, or
even subtle discrimination in the private sector. The impact on the religious practices of
religious minorities would be infinitely worse if they also had to enter the political fray
to protest the use of the government to advance the religious majority's ideals. This
impact would compound when children attend public schools, which are also under the
control of the local religious majority. The current Establishment Clause paradigm takes
all this into account and removes from local political groups the right to use their
political power locally to advance their religious interests.
This approach is not the only one that could be taken under the mantle of
democracy. It is possible to argue (as the proponents of the new paradigm do) that
democracy depends on the largely unfettered exercise of power by political majorities in
the relevant jurisdiction, and the plight of religious dissenters can be ameliorated by the
right to travel to other states whose populations reflect a different religious mixture. The
existing paradigm rejects this view of democracy as a recipe for religious tyranny,
Balkanization, and perhaps even eventual civil war. From the perspective of the current
paradigm, therefore, Justice Brandeis's "laboratories for experimentation" 64 justification
for federalism has no place.
B. The New Establishment Clause Paradigm
If the current Establishment Clause paradigm were summed up in one overweening
theme, it is that religion and democratic politics do not mix. The current paradigm's
approach to religion is not only countermajoritarian, it is counterpolitical. Under the
current paradigm, religion is outside the scope of political action altogether. Religion
may inform the values of the electorate in a way that eventually translates into political
action, but the Constitution prohibits political action that is about religion per se.
Perhaps the best way of distilling the differences between the new Establishment
Clause paradigm and the current paradigm is to note the antagonism that proponents of
the new paradigm express toward a simple metaphor. That metaphor, of course, is the
image Jefferson borrowed from Roger Williams regarding a wall of separation between
population is relatively small (less than 15% each) and the non-Christian population does not even register 1%.
Id. Moreover, if the portion of the population in Kentucky identifying itself as Baptist is combined with those
identifying themselves as generically Christian (8%), Methodist (5%), Pentecostal (4%), Church of Christ
(3%), Assembly of God (1%), and "nondenominational" (1%), then Protestant sects comprise over half the
population. Id. Indeed, throughout the South, Protestants dominate in ways that effectively foreclose any
competition from other sects if religious issues were subjected to unfettered political competition. Over 75% of
the respondents of the ARIS Survey identify with some Protestant Christian sect in Alabama, Arkansas,
Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, and West Virginia. Id. The
"Bible Belt" is a very real phenomenon and, if constitutional constraints were removed, the extent of religious
liberty in these states would be imperiled in ways that it would not be in other, more diverse areas of
the country.
64. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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church and state. 65  Although a great deal of ink has been spilled criticizing this
metaphor, 66 Jefferson's latter-day antagonists have rarely described in detail the full
implications of their proposed alterative to the separation of church and state, which
logically must entail the integration of church and state. The main objective of the new
Establishment Clause paradigm is to break down Jefferson's wall, and allow the
government to become infused with religion. Indeed, the central defining feature of the
new Establishment Clause paradigm is the premise that American politics is, always has
been, and should be, infused with religion. The new paradigm adopts the view long
professed by Michael McConnell and others, who argue that democracy is an empty
vessel without the support of "mediating institutions" such as churches. 67 According to
this view, religion provides the mechanism "by which the citizens in a liberal polity learn
to transcend their individual interests and opinions and ... develop civic
responsibility." 68 Justice Scalia has made the same point recently, although in originalist
fashion he places the words in the mouths of the Framers: "Those who wrote the
Constitution believed that morality was essential to the well-being of society and that
encouragement of religion was the best way to foster morality."
69
Much of this would be less controversial if all believers in this society adhered to a
universal religious construct. But when it comes to religion, the devil, so to speak, is in
the details, and history has witnessed countless long, bloody conflicts among believers
who dispute those details. Thus, the new paradigm will have to accommodate the fact
that competing religious factions who vie for control of the political process are also
vying for the authority to pick and choose among these contentious sectarian details.
The reality is that under the new paradigm, there is nothing to prevent an aggressively
religious majority from moving beyond the bland, benign, and uncontroversially generic
notion of "civic religion," in favor of adopting "a religion" (or "some religions") to give
the society a unifying social ethos.
According to the new paradigm, the particular form of religion that will define
American politics will be determined through the exercise of political power within the
framework of undiluted majoritarianism. As Justice Scalia has pointed out in defending
65. See Roger Williams, Mr. Cotton's Letter: Examined and Answered, in The Complete Writings of Roger
Williams vol. 1, 313, 392 (Russell & Russell, Inc. 1963).
66. See e.g. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (then-Justice Rehnquist exasperated and
lamented that "the Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted with Jefferson's misleading metaphor for
nearly 40 years"). In addition to using Jefferson's metaphor as a means of criticizing the concept of separation
itself, as Justice Rehnquist did, some critics have argued that modem commentators have misread Jefferson's
metaphor as intended to separate religion and state, as opposed to church and state. See e.g. Steven D. Smith,
Separation and the "Secular": Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 955, 973-74
(1989). Others have argued that Jefferson's metaphor was only intended to refer to the relationship between
the federal government and religion, and was never intended to apply to state establishments of religion.
See e.g. Daniel L. Dreisbach, Thomas Jefferson and the Wall of Separation between Church and State (NYU
Press 2002). Still others have argued that Jefferson did not originally intend to convey an intent to separate
church and state, and when he eventually came to that position in the nineteenth century, his arguments cut
against the broad social consensus. See e.g. Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State 19 (Harv. U.
Press 2004). 1
67. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation ofReligion, 1985 S. Ct. Rev. 1 (1985).
68. Id. at 17.
69. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2749 (Scalia, Thomas, JJ. & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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this approach, there are "legitimate competing interests"70 that justify favoring the values
of the religious majority over the values of religious minorities and other dissenters. 7 1
On the one hand, the interest of that minority in not feeling "excluded"; but on the
other, the interest of the overwhelming majority of religious believers in being
able to give God thanks and supplication as a people, and with respect to our
national endeavors. Our national tradition has resolved that conflict in favor of
the majority.72
There are several interesting things about this quote, starting with Justice Scalia's
unremarked extirpation of the Constitution's countermajoritarian function. In Justice
Scalia's scheme of religious liberty, the Religion Clauses apparently serve primarily to
assist the religious majority in advancing its sectarian mores as a sort of political just
deserts. On a more basic level, Justice Scalia's conflation of the majority's right to
impose its will on the minority with the minority's right to be free of such imposition is
reminiscent of Herbert Wechsler's infamous comment about the competing
constitutional rights at issue in Brown v. Board of Education.73 In response to Brown,
Wechsler thought that the white students' freedom not to associate with black students
counterbalanced the black students' equal protection claim. 74  Under the new
Establishment Clause paradigm, the religious majority's right to use its control over the
government to advance its religious views counterbalances the religious minority's right
to pursue its own religious path free of governmental interference and coercion. In both
instances, the majority's right cancels out the minority's, and the concept of
constitutional equality does little more than provide the purely formal assurance that both
the rich and the poor are prohibited from sleeping under bridges. 75 Under such schemes,
any pretense of political equality on the part of minorities is buried under the weight of
the new constitutional majoritarianism.
1. The Implications of the New Paradigm: The Transformation of the
- Neutrality and Coercion Mandates
The particular components of the new Establishment Clause paradigm can be
described easily as the opposite of the four main principles that define the current
70. Id. at 2756 (emphasis in original).
71. Id.
72. Id. (emphasis in original, footnote omitted).
73. Herbert Wechsler commented:
But if the freedom of association is denied by segregation, integration forces an association upon
those for whom it is unpleasant or repugnant. Is this not the heart of the issue involved, a conflict in
human claims of high dimension, not unlike many others that involve the highest
freedoms .... Given a situation where the state must .practically choose between denying the
association to those individuals who wish it or imposing it on those who would avoid it, is there a
basis in neutral principles for holding that the Constitution demands that the claims for association
should prevail? I should like to think there is, but I confess that I have not yet written the opinion.
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 34 (1959) (discussing
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)) (footnote omitted).
74. Id.
75. See Anatole France, The Red Lily 95 (Boni & Liveright, Inc.) ("[T]he face of the majestic equality of
the laws, which forbid rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.").
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Establishment Clause paradigm. As noted above, the centerpiece of the new paradigm is
the opposition to the basic notion of separation of church and state. Proponents of the
new paradigm staunchly oppose separationism as inherently discriminatory, in that it
forecloses religious adherents from participating in politics in the same way as everyone
else in society. According to the proponents of the new paradigm, religious individuals
and groups should be able to act politically in precisely the same way as all other
groups-by fighting for political power in the hopes of incorporating their most basic
values into law and enforcing them on everyone else in society.
The consequence of this rejection of separationism is the abandonment of the
religious neutrality constraint on the government. There is no logical way of avoiding
this consequence. Once it is recognized that religious activists have the right to make
their religious dictates an aspect of their political agenda, and once the nature of the
government is redefined to be historically bound up with religion, then the notion that the
government must be neutral between religion and nonreligion (or between powerful
religions and weak religions) simply makes no sense. Politics either may be religious or
it may not; there is no middle ground. If politics may be religious in nature, then
religious activists may use their political victories to pursue religious ends, and once
religious ends are accepted as legitimate governmental pursuits, then the concept
neutrality is already abandoned. None of this should be a controversial extrapolation of
the new paradigm. Justice Scalia has written extensively of this brave new world, and
has drawn exactly the same conclusions:
With all of this reality (and much more) staring it in the face, how can the Court
possibly assert that 'the First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality
between... religion and nonreligion,"' and that "[m]anifesting a purpose to
favor ... adherence to religion generally," is unconstitutional? Who says so? Surely not
the words of the Constitution. Surely not the history and traditions that reflect our
society's constant understanding of those words.... And it is, moreover, a thoroughly
discredited say-so. It is discredited, to begin with, because a majority of the Justices on the
current Court (including at least one Member of today's majority) have, in separate
opinions, repudiated the brain-spun "Lemon test" that embodies the supposed principle of
neutrality between religion and irreligion.... And it is discredited because the Court has
not had the courage (or the foolhardiness) to apply the neutrality principle consistently.76
Under the new paradigm all but the most direct and egregious forms of
governmental coercion of religious minorities (and certainly nonreligious minorities) are
logically permissible. Thus, one person can be forced to sit through religious exercises
as a condition of partaking in government functions, 77 and religious minorities and
members of religious groups who oppose any form of state support for churches can
nevertheless be forced to pay for the religious majority's religious activities (in the form
76. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2750-51 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ. & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(emphasis, first and second ellipses, and bracket in original; citations omitted).
77. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 646 (Scalia, White, Thomas, JJ. & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Constitution does not protect dissenting students from state-sponsored prayer at public school graduation
ceremonies on the ground that "To deprive our society of that important unifying mechanism, in order to spare
the nonbeliever what seems to me the minimal inconvenience of standing or even sitting in respectful
nonparticipation, is as senseless in policy as it is unsupported in law.").
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of governmental payments to religious organizations). 7 8  Under the new paradigm,
the Court's focus on financial aid to religion cases will no longer be on the coercion of
the taxpayer who pays the bill, but rather the direct governmental coercion of those who
receive the governmental services-and even then, it is not clear whether the Court's
new majority will exercise much control over the newly enriched religious enterprises.
The plurality in Mitchell v. Helms79 probably spoke for the Court's new majority when it
dismissed the coercive implications of direct government financing of religious
indoctrination:
If the religious, irreligious, and areligious are all alike eligible for governmental
aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that any particular recipient
conducts has been done at the behest of the government. For attribution of
indoctrination is a relative question. If the government is offering assistance to
recipients who provide, so to speak, a broad range of indoctrination, the
government itself is not thought responsible for any particular indoctrination.
8 0
Under this analysis, a government program directly financing churches would not
constitute coercion in violation of the Establishment Clause so long as all churches are
allowed to partake of the government's largess, and no one is forced to attend the
government-financed church service.
The consequences of the abandonment of governmental neutrality in matters of
religion will be far-reaching. As we move into the era of the new Establishment Clause
paradigm, we can expect more opinions like the recent Fourth Circuit decision in
Simpson v. Chesterfield County Board of Supervisors.8 1 This case involved the policy of
a local board of supervisors in a suburb near Richmond, Virginia, under which the board
expressly authorizes invocations at its public meetings.82 The invocation is given by
various religious leaders from the community who are invited to participate by the
board's clerk. 83  Most of the invitees are Christian, although there were "several"
Muslim and Jewish invitees as well. 84 The plaintiff was a resident of the county and also
a leader of a local Wiccan group. 85 She requested that the county add her to the list of
religious leaders who could be invited to give invocations before the board meetings, but
was told by the board's clerk that she was not eligible because she was not
monotheistic.8 6 According to the clerk: "'Chesterfield's non-sectarian invocations are
78. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 643-44 (upholding indirect government financing of religious schools);
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 801, 820 (plurality opinion). Mitchell upheld direct government financing of religious
schools, and permitted the schools to divert government money to financing specifically religious activities:
So long as the governmental aid is not itself "unsuitable for use in the public schools because of
religious content," and eligibility for aid is determined in a constitutionally permissible manner,
any use of that aid to indoctrinate cannot be attributed to the government and is thus not of
constitutional concern.
530 U.S. at 820 (citation omitted).
79. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
80. Id. at 809-10 (plurality).
81. 404 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2005).
82. Id. at 278.
83. Id. at 279.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Simpson, 404 F.3d at 280.
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traditionally made to a divinity that is consistent with the Judeo-Christian tradition,'
a divinity that would not be invoked by practitioners of witchcraft.",
87
The Fourth Circuit held that the board's decision to exclude the Wiccan leader did
not violate the Establishment Clause. 88 The court applied the sort of illogic that will
become more common in the new era. According to the court, by excluding the Wiccan
the board was demonstrating its religious inclusiveness:
To ban all manifestations of [civic] faith would needlessly transform and
devitalize the very nature of our culture. When we gather as Americans, we do
not abandon all expressions of religious faith. Instead, our expressions evoke
common and inclusive themes and forswear, as Chesterfield has done, the
forbidding character of sectarian invocations.
89
The problem with this explanation is that it was used to uphold an explicitly sectarian
refusal to permit polytheists to participate in the official invocations. Thus, religious
exclusion is described as religious inclusion, and religious neutrality is a term used to
justify religious partisanship.
This is the inverted world in which we will soon be living: The government's
sectarian preference for the majority's faith will be deemed "common and inclusive,"
which in the spirit of the new paradigm means that dissenters will be invited to join the
religious majority in celebrating its "common" faith. Religious liberty will be preserved,
presumably, by the fact that if the religious minorities decide to join in the majority's
celebration of itself, then the majority will be happy to include them in the festivities.
In such a world, legal language is corrupted as much as constitutional principles.
The courts cannot admit that their new system is not neutral, because the nominal
expectation of neutrality has become embedded in our sense of constitutional fair play.
So the courts will simply conscript constitutional terms like "neutrality," denude them of
meaning, debase them, and then use them to describe a phenomenon whose
characteristics are precisely the opposite of the term's ordinary meaning. As George
Orwell once said of political speech and writing, legal language under the new paradigm
will lose its precision, and "consist largely of euphemism, question-begging and sheer
cloudy vagueness."
90
2. The Implications of the New Paradigm: The Linkage of Religion and
Citizenship
It follows from the majoritarian premises of the new Establishment Clause
paradigm that citizenship and religion will become increasingly intertwined.
Participation in the political process will not be limited by religion, but political success
will be. If, as the proponents of the new paradigm argue, history demonstrates that
mainstream religion is part of the country's political heritage, and if religion provides the
civic values that are the necessary underpinning for the entire political culture, then
87. Id.
88. Id. at 288.
89. Id. at 287.
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access to political power will (and should) effectively be limited to those who accept and
publicly identify with the beliefs of the religious majority. Those who step outside the
religious mainstream are not just religious dissenters, they are also political outsiders.
From the perspective of the new paradigm, Justice O'Connor's explanation for the
endorsement analysis was factually accurate, but theoretically flawed. Justice O'Connor
argued that official endorsement of religion was unconstitutional because it "'sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community." '9 1 From the perspective of those supporting the
new paradigm, there is nothing wrong with teaching nonadherents that they are outsiders
because as a practical matter they are outsiders. This is the implicit message behind all
the various opinions written by Justices and commentators who advocate the new
Establishment Clause paradigm, and in recent opinions the message has increasingly
been made explicit. "With respect to public acknowledgment of religious belief, it is
entirely clear from our Nation's historical practices that the Establishment Clause
permits this disregard of polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it
permits the disregard of devout atheists." 92 There is no other way to interpret Justice
Scalia's blunt assertion of religious hegemony over various categories of heretics and
apostates, other than to recognize that under the new paradigm, religion will be one of
the primary bases for identifying favored and disfavored citizens.
The consequences of this sea change in the Court's approach toward the proper
relationship of citizenship and religion can be extended far beyond the realm of
Establishment Clause cases. Once religion is understood as a legal matter to be directly
relevant to the development and dissemination of political values, then religious devotion
also will logically be perceived by the public as relevant to a political candidate's
qualifications. This undoubtedly already happens, although it usually occurs in
unspoken ways. In most parts of the country, an avowed atheist or agnostic who has the
bad judgment to announce that fact will have no chance of winning a political contest.
In many parts of the country, an avowed Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, or Wiccan will suffer
the same fate. Under the new paradigm, this is as it should be. If one takes seriously the
new paradigm's central understanding that religious values provide the basis for the
political culture, then which values are being advanced by a political candidate should be
a crucial part of the debate in each campaign. The detailed religious views of
everyone-including atheists and other religious pariahs-may be (and should be,
according to the logic of the new paradigm) made the subject of every political
campaign. This scheme is virtually an invitation to social division along religious lines,
and the lessons of the formal legal doctrine can be expected to filter back into broader
social attitudes and political discourse.
91. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
92. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2753 (Scalia, Thomas, JJ. & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
2006]
21
Gey: Rewriting the Establishment Clause for One Nation under (a) God
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2005
TULSA LA W RE VIEW
3. The Implications of the New Paradigm: Religion as a Public Affair
A third implication of the new Establishment Clause paradigm is that religion is a
public, rather than a private affair. The first sense in which that principle will apply will
be in government-operated public ceremonies such as public school graduations.
The premise in this context is that the Nation's history and culture demands that the
religious majority be permitted to pay deference to its God in public as well as in private.
Any attempt to forestall such public obeisance would in effect suppress one of the most
important components of the majority's religiosity. As Justice Scalia has phrased this
point: "Religious men and women of almost all denominations have felt it necessary to
acknowledge and beseech the blessing of God as a people, and not just as individuals,
because they believe in the 'protection of divine Providence,' as the Declaration of
Independence put it, not just for individuals but for societies. ' 9 3
The implications of recognizing religion as a public as well as a private matter will
go beyond simple ceremonial religious observations. Again, one of the central premises
of the new paradigm is that in the American political scheme religious values and
political values are intertwined. If so, then the development of socially beneficial
religious values should be a legitimate concern of the government. Thus, the
development and preservation of proper religious values, like their political counterparts,
should be a legitimate matter for government action.
This corollary of the new Establishment Clause paradigm will play itself out in the
public schools. At the most basic level, if the Court's new reading of the Constitution is
predicated on a historical understanding that the country's political structure has always
been extensively imbued with religion,94 that "the government's invocation of God ... is
unobjectionable," 95 and that religion is the source of the country's civic values, 96 then it
is hard to fathom why the government's schools should not be able to incorporate all
these themes in their curriculum and urge the students in the class to adopt the society's
chosen values as their own. In a sense, this is the core of the debate over the religious
language in the Pledge of Allegiance. 97 In fact, in that case some of the proponents of
the new Establishment Clause paradigm have already agreed that the schools should be
allowed to recognize that "our Nation was founded on a fundamental belief in God."98
It is difficult to find a logical limit once one accepts this basic notion. If the public
schools can "acknowledge" the country's grounding in one contestable religious
proposition, then it is not a large step to do the same with other equally contestable
religious propositions-all of which will be chosen according to the religious views of
the political majority in mind.
As with the abandonment of the concept of neutrality, the courts are unlikely to
admit that they are permitting the schools to engage in proselytizing on behalf of the
93. Lee, 505 U.S. at 645 (Scalia, White, Thomas, JJ. & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
94. See McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2751-52 (Scalia, Thomas, JJ. & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 2756.
96. See supra n. 63 and accompanying text.
97. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 26-33 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that public
schools should be able to incorporate religious references in the official Pledge).
98. Id. at 31 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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religious majority. But their avoidance of the obvious will take the absurd form of
claiming that an official endorsement of "God" is "in no sense ... an endorsement of any
religion," 99 and the equally absurd proposition that an officially sanctioned exercise





In the end, the burden of this aspect of the new paradigm will fall on religious
minorities to take the protection of their idiosyncratic faiths into their own hands. Under
the new paradigm, the government will be allowed to embrace a position ascribed by
Justice Kennedy to the Connecticut school in Lee v. Weisman: 10 1 "The essence of the
Government's position is that with regard to a civic, social occasion of this importance it
is the objector, not the majority, who must take unilateral and private action to avoid
compromising religious scruples, hereby electing to miss the graduation exercise."
102
Justice Kennedy concluded this description by noting that "This turns conventional First
Amendment analysis on its head." 10 3  This is an accurate description of the new
paradigm as a whole, but with the possible exception of the cases involving religion in
the public schools, Justice Kennedy appears to have joined in turning the
First Amendment upside-down.
4. The Implications of the New Paradigm: Religion as a Matter of
Local Concern
The final aspect of the new constitutional paradigm is the assertion that religion is
largely a matter of local, rather than national concern. This principle derives from the
argument that the Establishment Clause was intended-and should currently be
interpreted-to apply only to limit the federal government's interference with the
religious activities of the states. This interpretation would effectively nullify the
Establishment Clause, insofar as the Clause would cease to protect any individual right at
all; the Establishment Clause would become merely a specialized version of the newly
revived Tenth Amendment. 
104
This is the only one of the four general principles defining the new paradigm that
will not yet have majority support in the reconstituted Supreme Court. Only Justice
Thomas has thus far embraced this argument, although Justice Scalia has also hinted that
he finds some merit in this interpretation. 105  In Justice Thomas's version of the
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
102. Id. at 596.
103. Id.
104. For examples of new Tenth Amendment protections of state sovereignty, see Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that the federal government may not enlist state executive officials to carry out
federal law), and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that the federal government may not
commandeer state legislatures to carry out federal policies).
105. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 641 (Scalia, White, Thomas, JJ. & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Scalia is
not, however, so enamored of federalism when the shoe is on the other foot. In Locke v. Davey, he dissented to
the majority's holding that the State of Washington had the authority to withhold state funding from a college
student seeking a degree in order to enter the ministry. 540 U.S. 712 (2004). Justice Scalia (who was joined by
Justice Thomas-the other purported advocate of strong federalism on these matters) argued that this state
nonestablishment rule violated the neutrality requirement of the Free Exercise Clause. See id. at 726 (Scalia &
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argument, "[tlhe text and history of the Establishment Clause strongly suggest that it is a
federalism provision intended to prevent Congress from interfering with state
establishments."' 10 6 The only concession to the religious liberty-protecting function of
the Establishment Clause is that "[a]s a textual matter, this Clause probably prohibits
Congress from establishing a national religion,"'10 7 but it does not reach any further.
Put simply: "The Establishment Clause does not purport to protect individual rights."'
10 8
Under this interpretation, the Establishment Clause not only fails to prohibit state
establishments of religion, it also would bar any branch of the federal government from
interfering with state establishments. 
1 0 9
Whether a majority of the Supreme Court is willing to go this far toward
abandoning all constitutional constraints on state establishments is doubtful. But in the
end it will not matter. Having eviscerated the other protections of the Establishment
Clause, the states can do almost everything they want to advance the majority's religious
ideals, even if the Clause still supposedly applies beyond the federal government.
The federalism interpretation is simply one way of reaching the destination of permitting
the integration of religion into government-a goal that other members of the Court can
reach quite easily via other routes. A quick perusal of the doctrinal implications of the
new paradigm will illustrate this point.
I1. THE DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE PARADIGM
One of the few pieces of good news about the coming change in the Supreme
Court's church/state jurisprudence is that it will probably clarify what has become one of
the murkiest areas of modem constitutional doctrine. In recent years, there have been no
fewer than ten different Establishment Clause standards that have commanded the
allegiance of one or more Justices on the Court. The situation was made worse by the
fact that some Justices have supported more than one standard, and some Justices have
interpreted the same standards differently than other Justices. All of this has left lower
courts in the uncomfortable position of trying to reconcile standards that by their nature
often point toward different constitutional conclusions.
The new majority on the Court will undoubtedly prune the available options for
adjudicating matters of church and state under the Establishment Clause. This does not
mean that the other standards will disappear from the pages of the United States Reports.
The four remaining supporters of the separationist ideal will attempt to preserve some or
all of the old standards for posterity. But the lower courts (which are themselves
increasingly populated by judges who have no great love for Madison and Jefferson) can
treat these dissenting opinions with the same deference they afford to law review
Thomas, JJ., dissenting). Thus is the theory of neutrality transformed from a shield against establishments of
religion, to a sword assisting in the advancement of state establishments.
106. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 49 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
107. Id. at 50.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 51 (arguing that the incorporation of the Establishment Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment
"would prohibit precisely what the Establishment Clause was intended to protect-state establishments of
religion" (emphasis in original)).
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articles-a largely irrelevant academic sideshow carried on largely for the entertainment
of the authors, while the real law is being made elsewhere.
The easiest way to describe the doctrinal effects of the new religious
majoritarianism is to weed through the standards, that are now scattered among the
Court's modem church/state decisions. It is easy to identify the standards that will be
quickly abandoned under the new regime, and also relatively easy to identify the
standards that will now come to the fore. The only question arises in the context of the
cases involving religion in public school. In recent years, Justice Kennedy has expressed
reservations about applying to religion-in-school cases the logic of the standards he
applies outside the school context. 110 In all other contexts, however, it will become
much simpler to explain-if not to justify-the government's new ability to embrace,
endorse, and finance the majority's religious symbols and institutions.
A. Lemon and the Other Carcasses of the Current Paradigm
'It is almost eertain that the new majority on the Supreme Court will abandon five
of the standards currently used by some members of the Court. These standards are all
associated to some degree with the goal of separating church and state, and therefore will
have no place in the new constitutional universe of religious majoritarianism.
The standards to be renounced include the three-part Lemon test, Justice O'Connor's
endorsement analysis, the theory of substantive neutrality, Justice Breyer's new concern
with religious divisiveness, and Justice O'Connor's and Breyer's notions that
Establishment Clause cases can be decided in an ad hoc manner, ensuring on a
fact-specific basis that the government is doing nothing to associate itself too closely
with religion.
Lemon will likely be the first casualty of the new Establishment Clause paradigm.
As noted above, I I1 the Lemon test requires every government action to be justified by a
secular purpose, to have a secular effect, and to be free of entanglements between church
and state.ll2 If applied rigorously, these requirements would guarantee a
Jeffersonian-style strict separation between church and state. For this reason, the Lemon
test has been the bete noire of the Court's conservatives ever since it was adopted by the
Court in 1971 as the primary standard governing Establishment Clause cases. Ever since
then, it has been reviled by those on the Court who take a more benign view of the
joinder of church and state.113 The secular purpose requirement of Lemon certainly will
have no place in a regime governed by the new paradigm. Indeed, since the proponents
of the new paradigm view the Establishment Clause as primarily motivated by the desire
110. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. 290 (joining the majority in applying the Lemon and
endorsement analyses to hold unconstitutional a "voluntary" prayer at a public high school football game);
Lee, 505 U.S. 577 (applying a broad coercion theory to strike down prayer at a public high school
graduation ceremony).
Ill. See supra nn. 44-47 and accompanying text.
112. SeeLemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
113. Lemon's most colorful critic has been Justice Scalia, whose pique at Lemon's resilience could usually
be ascertained from his overheated metaphors: "Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly
sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our
Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school [board] attorneys."
Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
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to permit the government to advance religion, the Lemon secular purpose analysis-
which specifically prohibits the government from doing anything with the intent of
advancing religion-is directly contrary to the spirit of the new era. In Justice Scalia's
explanation of this theme,
[t]hose responsible for the adoption of the Religion Clauses would surely regard it
as a bitter irony that the religious values they designed those Clauses to protect
have now become so distasteful to this Court that if they constitute anything more
than a subordinate motive for government action they will invalidate it. 1
For much the same reason, the Lemon secular effect analysis also is contrary to the basic
theme of the new Establishment Clause paradigm, which posits that religious effects
constitute an overall social and political good. The proponents of the new paradigm will
not have to spend time dispensing with the final, entanglement prong of Lemon since
they have already effectively euthanized that requirement by subsuming it into the
secular effect analysis. 115 As the secular effect requirement goes, therefore, so
goes entanglement.
The second standard that will be quickly abandoned in the new Establishment
Clause regime will be Justice O'Connor's endorsement analysis. This analysis is a
modification of the first two prongs of Lemon, focusing on whether the "government's
actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion [and] whether, irrespective of
government's actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of
endorsement or disapproval. An affirmative answer to either question should render the
challenged practice invalid."1 16 Since the endorsement analysis builds on Lemon, the
Court's new majority will have no trouble simultaneously casting aside both standards.
But the new majority will have another reason for abandoning endorsement, which is
that the endorsement analysis is intended to forestall the use of religion to determine the
status of political insiders and outsiders. 117 This will no longer be a matter of
constitutional concern under the new paradigm. As Justice Scalia has bluntly pointed
out, the new version of the Establishment Clause will permit the government to
"disregard ... polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it permits the
disregard of devout atheists." 118 In light of this harsh new religious realpolitik, Justice
O'Connor's concern that the government should not send the message that some
religious practitioners are political insiders and other religious practitioners are political
outsiders seems like little more than a quaint artifact of a bygone, gentler time.
Three other constitutional standards will also be abandoned quickly once the Court
adopts the new Establishment Clause paradigm: the divisiveness standard, the ad hoc
analysis, and the substantive neutrality requirement. Divisiveness has become a major
concern of Justice Breyer. Justice Breyer has been increasingly concerned with the
114. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2758 (Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, JJ. & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
115. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 668 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that "we [have] folded the
entanglement inquiry into the primary effect inquiry").
116. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
117. See supra nn. 40-54 and accompanying text.
118. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2753 (Scalia, Thomas, JJ. & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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possibility that the government's activities on behalf of religion will foster in society a
dangerous divisiveness along religious lines. In Zelman, Justice Breyer cited the
avoidance of religious strife and divisiveness as a central objective of a separationist
Establishment Clause:
In a society as religiously diverse as ours, the Court has recognized that we
must rely on the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment to protect against
religious strife, particularly when what is at issue is an area as central to religious
belief as the shaping, through primary education, of the next generation's minds
and spirits. 119
In Van Orden v. Perry,120 Justice Breyer seems to have elevated the divisiveness
concern to an actual Establishment Clause standard. He once again described the
purpose of the Religion Clauses as "[seeking] to avoid that divisiveness based upon
religion that promotes social conflict, sapping the strength of government and religion
alike."' 12 1 He then applied this concern to the Ten Commandments display outside the
Texas state capitol, and ruled that the display was constitutional because "as a practical
matter of degree this display is unlikely to prove divisive."' 122
It is unclear what measure of divisiveness Justice Breyer would require before
striking down a state action as a violation of the Establishment Clause. In any event,
Justice Breyer's linkage of divisiveness with the separation of church and state is enough
to ensure that divisiveness will not be a focal point in the new Establishment Clause era.
Indeed, several members of the Court's new majority have already rejected any attempt
to derive a constitutional standard from the fear of religious division. It is unclear, they
argue, "where Justice Breyer would locate this presumed authority to deprive Cleveland
residents of a program that they have chosen but that we subjectively find 'divisive.'
We quite rightly have rejected the claim that some speculative potential for divisiveness
bears on the constitutionality of educational aid programs."' 123 This conclusion should
not be surprising. If the new Establishment Clause paradigm assumes 124 that religion is
now a legitimate basis for political disputes, then divisiveness along religious lines will
inevitably ensue as a natural consequence of the newly politicized religious atmosphere.
The apparent solution to the problem of religious divisiveness in the new society is
effective political domination by the strongest sects.
By the same token, the new majority will have little patience with Breyer's
embrace of a flexible, ad hoc approach to Establishment Clause cases, since this
approach leaves open the possibility that the Court would strike down some examples of
government favoritism toward religion. In Van Orden, Justice Breyer combined his
newfound concern with religious divisiveness with a renunciation of any attempt to
define a unified standard for adjudicating Establishment Clause disputes. He stated:
"While the Court's prior tests provide useful guideposts.., no exact formula can dictate
119. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 725 (Breyer, Stevens & Souter, JJ., dissenting).
120. 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
121. Id. at 2868 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
122. Id. at 2871 (emphasis in original).
123. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662 n. 7 (majority).
124. See supra pt. 11.
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a resolution to such fact-intensive cases."' 12 5 In this respect, Justice Breyer seems to
have adopted the ad hoc approach to Establishment Clause cases suggested several years
earlier by Justice O'Connor. Justice O'Connor urged the Court to avoid seeking a
"Grand Unified Theory that. would resolve all the cases that may arise under
[the Establishment Clause],"' 126 in favor of a series of individual tests covering
"narrower and more homogeneous" areas. 127 From the perspective of the proponents of
the new paradigm, the problem with this ad hoc approach is that its proponents persist in
their unwillingness to forego the pursuit of the separation of church and state. So long as
those principles continue to serve as the guidepost for any standard or set of standards,
then even a flexible mechanism for applying those principles will be inconsistent with
the thrust of the new paradigm.
The final standard that will be quickly abandoned under the new paradigm is the
concept of substantive neutrality. As Justice Souter has pointed out, the term
"neutrality" has been used in a variety of different ways over the years by different
members of the Court. 12 8  The theory of substantive neutrality, as once defined by
Douglas Laycock, is the theory that "the religion clauses require government to minimize
the extent to which it either encourages or discourages religious belief or disbelief,
practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance." ' 129  In recent years, Justice
O'Connor occasionally seems to have been drawn to the notion of substantive neutrality.
Her endorsement analysis seems directed, in part, at requiring the government to do
nothing that would link political participation with religion in a way that would
encourage or discourage religious belief. Some notion of substantive neutrality may
have also been behind Justice O'Connor's rejection of the theory of formal neutrality in
circumstances involving the ability of religious organizations to divert government funds
to specifically religious purposes. 13  It seems clear, however, that any appeal to
substantive neutrality is inconsistent with the new Establishment Clause paradigm.
As Justice Scalia and others have made clear in their opinions in the school prayer,
Ten Commandments, and Pledge of Allegiance cases, the new paradigm does not
prevent the government from encouraging religious belief, practice, and observance.
As Justice Scalia recently summed up the perspective of the new paradigm, "the Court's
oft repeated assertion that the government cannot favor religious practice is false."' 13 1
The requirement of substantive neutrality, therefore, like the Lemon secular purpose and
effect requirements, is inconsistent at its core with the majoritarian spirit of the new
Establishment Clause, and will be abandoned in the new regime.
125. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2869 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted).
126. Bd of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 718 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
127. Id. at 721.
128. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 878-79 (Souter, Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (describing various
different ways in which the Court has used the term neutrality).
129. Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality toward Religion, 39 DePaul
L. Rev. 993, 1001 (1990) (footnote omitted).
130. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 837 (O'Connor & Breyer, JJ., concurring in the judgment) (objectingthat the
plurality's theory of formal neutrality "comes close to assigning that factor singular importance in the future
adjudication of Establishment Clause challenges to government school aid programs").
131. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2748 (Scalia, Thomas, JJ. & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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B. The Doctrinal Framework of the New Paradigm
So what is left in the way of constitutional standards under the new paradigm?
There are four standards that will dominate discussions of the Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. One of these-the nonincorporation standard, which asserts that the
Establishment Clause should never have been incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment and applied to the states-has been discussed above. 132 Justice Thomas
(and possibly Justice Scalia) will undoubtedly continue to press this theory, but there is
no indication that a sufficient number of other Justices will join them in pressing for this
most radical of approaches to the deconstitutionalization of church/state relations.
In fact, it does not matter, because the other standards the Court will adopt to apply the
new Establishment Clause paradigm will have the same effect of permitting the states
(and the federal government, for that matter) to do pretty much whatever they want to
advance religion in various ways.
The standards the Court will use have already been articulated by the existing
proponents of the new paradigm. The two most prominent standards are the formal
neutrality standard and the narrow (or legal) coercion analysis. The formal neutrality
standard is the standard the new paradigm proponents apply in the government financing
cases. Under this analysis, government aid to religious institutions does not violate the
Establishment Clause if it is distributed in a program whose terms are formally neutral,
i.e., permit both secular and religious applicants to receive the aid.
The specific applications of this standard have already been incorporated and
worked out in recent cases involving government financing of religious activities.
Where the aid is given to religious institutions indirectly (for example, through parents
participating in a voucher program), the government aid program does not violate the
Establishment Clause "where [the] government aid program is neutral with respect to
religion, and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct
government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and
independent private choice." 133  Where the aid is given to the religious institutions
directly, it does not violate the Constitution if the government program "determines
eligibility for aid neutrally, allocates that aid based on the private choices of the parents
of schoolchildren, and does not provide aid that has an impermissible content."
' 134
The proponents of the new paradigm have emphasized that it does not matter if the
overwhelming proportion of government aid is given to religious institutions, 135 and it
does not matter if a religious institution receiving direct grants of government funds
diverts those funds to specifically religious purposes. 136 Under such a lax standard,
virtually any amount of government financing of religion will be permissible, so long as
132. See supra nn. 105-109 and accompanying text.
133. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652.
134. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 829.
135. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 647 (noting that 96% of the students receiving government voucher money
attended religious schools).
136. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 824 ("[W]e fail to see how indoctrination by means of (i.e., diversion of)
such [government] aid could be attributed to the government.").
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the government is careful to craft its funding program in a way that parrots the pretense
that the religious uses of the government funds are not attributable to the government.
In cases other than funding cases-such as cases in which the government
embraces religious symbols or doctrine-the standard that will be used to apply the new
paradigm is the narrow coercion analysis. Under this analysis, the government violates
the Constitution only if it "[coerces] religious orthodoxy and ... financial support by
force of law and threat of penalty."' 137 This standard would apparently apply only when
the government literally mandates that an individual join a particular church or
participate in its worship service. Justice Scalia's example of impermissible coercion
refers to the pre-Revolutionary Virginia practice, under which "ministers were required
by law to conform to the doctrine and rites of the Church of England; and all persons
were required to attend church and observe the Sabbath, were tithed for the public
support of Anglican ministers, and were taxed for the costs of building and repairing
churches." 138  Any government action that falls short of this extreme example is
apparently constitutional.
A third standard that may be cited by the Court's new Establishment Clause
majority is the nonpreferentialist standard, which then-Justice Rehnquist advanced
several decades ago as an alternative to Lemon and the other separationist standards.
Under this analysis, "nothing in the Establishment Clause requires government to be
strictly neutral between religion and irreligion." 139  The nonpreferentialist analysis
would replace the Court's longstanding principle that the Court has "rejected
unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids only governmental
preference of one religion over another." 140 Justice Scalia seems to have something like
the nonpreferentialist analysis in mind when he asserts bluntly that "the Court's oft
repeated assertion that the government cannot favor religious practice is false."
14 1
The question with regard to the nonpreferentialist analysis is not whether the
Court's new majority would go so far as to suggest that the government can favor
religion over nonreligion-they have clearly indicated that they will. The question,
rather, is whether the new majority will go beyond nonpreferentialism to adopt the even
more radical proposition that the government may favor particular religions (or groups of
religions), in addition to favoring religion generically over nonreligion. Justice Scalia
has already arrived at this more radical destination. In his McCreary County dissent,
Justice Scalia specifically embraced the notion that the government can favor
monotheistic religions over polytheistic religions, agnosticism, and atheism.
142
He justified this by reference to the country's "historical practices,'' 143 and by reference
to the fact that the overwhelming number of people in the country belong to monotheistic
faiths.144 He first noted that "[t]he three most popular religions in the United States,
137. Lee, 505 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, White, Thomas, JJ. & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
138. Id. at 641.
139. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
140. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 216.
141. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2748 (Scalia, Thomas, JJ. & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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Christianity, Judaism, and Islam-which combined account for 97.7% of all believers-
are monotheistic." 145  He then added that the religious beliefs at issue in that case
(i.e., that the Ten Commandments were given by God to Moses) "are recognized across
such a broad and diverse range of the population-from Christians to Muslims-that
they cannot be reasonably understood as a government endorsement of a particular
religious viewpoint."'
14 6
These are exceedingly strange claims. First, it is unclear why the government
ceases to be endorsing a religious viewpoint simply because the viewpoint it is endorsing
is widely held. Second, it is unclear why Justice Scalia does not even see fit to count as
affected parties those who do not have any religious point of view. According to the
same source that Justice Scalia relies upon as the basis for his claim that 97.7% of
believers are monotheistic, 14 7 another 14.1% of the population describes itself as
nonreligious, 148 and another 5.4% refuse to respond to the question about their religious
affiliation. 149  Thus, the activity that Justice Scalia describes as not "reasonably
understood as a government endorsement of a particular religious viewpoint"' 150 is
actually an activity that is disavowed by between 16.4% (the number of nonbelievers and
polytheists) 15 1 and 21.7% (a number that includes the unresponsive) 152 of the
population. If the government can endorse a religious viewpoint that roughly 20% of the
population rejects, it is difficult to see why the government would be constitutionally
prohibited from endorsing a viewpoint that 49% of the population rejects.
When considered in light of Justice Scalia's other comments to the effect that the
government can "disregard" polytheists, "believers in unconcerned deities," agnostics
and atheists, 153 then the system framed by the new Establishment Clause paradigm is
revealed as embodying the rankest kind of sectarian hegemony and discrimination.
The only remaining question is whether the conservatives on the Court will follow
Justice Scalia down this dark path.
145. Id. (citing U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2004-2005, http://www.census
.gov/prod/2004pubs/04statab/pop.pdf, at tbl. 67 (124th ed., U.S. Census Bureau 2004) (relying on the ARIS
Survey, supra n. 63)).
146. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2753 (Scalia, Thomas, JJ. & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted).
147. See supra n. 145 and accompanying text.
148. ARIS Survey, supra n. 63, at ex. 1, http://www.gc.cuny.edu/faculty/research-briefs/aris/
keyfindings.htm.
149. Id.
150. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2753 (footnote omitted).
151. The ARIS Survey cites the percentage of nonbelievers at 14.1%; 97.7% are monotheistic based upon the
three most popular religions in the United States, leading to the conclusion that 2.3% are polytheistic.
See supra nn. 145-148 and accompanying text. When added together, the percentages of nonbelievers and
polytheistic sum to 16.4%.
152. The same ARIS Survey cites the percentage of those not responding to the survey at 5.4%. Together
with 16.4% of nonbelievers-polytheists, 21.7% of the population disavows the activity described by Justice
Scalia. See supra nn. 149-151 and accompanying text.
153. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2753.
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C. Justice Kennedy and the Residue of the Current Paradigm
In at least one area of frequent Establishment Clause litigation, it appears that the
Court's new religious majority may not hold its fifth vote. Since he wrote the majority
opinion striking down the graduation prayer in Lee v. Weisman, 154 Justice Kennedy has
voted with the remaining separationists on the Court in cases involving religion in the
public schools. 155 He has, however, refused to embrace constitutional standards such as
Lemon and the endorsement analysis, choosing instead to rely on a broad conception of
coercion to prevent the public schools from endorsing religion or foisting the majority's
religious symbols and ideas on unwilling students. This is the tenth and final test
currently used on the Court, and it will survive largely as one Justice's check on the
Court's willingness to adopt a standard giving the government virtually unconstrained
authority to engage in activity advancing the majority's religious beliefs and institutions.
The theory is deemed "broad coercion" because it views the concept of coercion to
include more than formal legal penalties or sanctions. In the context of the graduation
prayer at issue in Lee v. Weisman, Kennedy concluded, the concept of coercion required
a recognition of the peer group pressure that necessarily attended the prayer at the
graduation ceremony: "The Constitution forbids the State to exact religious conformity
from a student as the price of attending her own high school graduation. This is the
calculus the Constitution commands."' 156 Thus, even though the State did not write the
prayer, or dictate the prayer's content, or force dissenters to participate in the prayer as a
condition of receiving their diploma, the Establishment Clause still prohibited
the exercise.
There is no reason to suspect that Justice Kennedy will not continue to exhibit the
same sensitivity to the concerns of religious dissenters in the atmosphere of a public
school. It is interesting that he does not extend the same sensitivity to dissenters outside
the school context. He has written opinions objecting strenuously to the imposition of
constitutional limits on state-sanctioned religious displays outside the school context,
157
and joined the opinions of the Court authorizing the transfer of large amounts of state
funds to religious schools, both indirectly 158 and directly. 15 9 In these opinions, he has
joined the other proponents of the new paradigm in advancing an almost purely
majoritarian notion of church/state relations. This position contrasts starkly with his
vivid insistence in Lee that the "sense of history" that motivated those who wrote the
Establishment Clause was the lesson that "in the hands of government what might begin
as a tolerant expression of religious views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and coerce.
A state-created orthodoxy puts at grave risk that freedom of belief and conscience which
are the sole assurance that religious faith is real, not imposed." 160  It is difficult to
154. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
155. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. 290 (joining the majority opinion was Justice Kennedy,
holding unconstitutional a "voluntary" prayer at a public high school football game).
156. Lee, 505 U.S. at 596.
157. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670 (Kennedy, White & Scalia, JJ. & Rehnquist, C.J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
158. SeeZelman, 536 U.S. at641.
159. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 801.
160. Lee, 505 U.S. at 591-92.
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reconcile the view of the constitutional universe articulated by Justice Kennedy in the
school cases, in which the Constitution continues to tie the hands of an aggressive
religious majority, and the view he expresses, or accedes to, in the non-school cases, in
which the same aggressive religious majority can do pretty much as it sees fit.
Perhaps the internal contradictions in his approach to the Establishment Clause will
resolve themselves as Justice Kennedy begins to see the implications of removing
constitutional constraints, but so far there is no sign that this process of reconciliation has
even started.
IV. THE REMAINS OF RELIGIOUS CIVIL LIBERTIES UNDER THE
NEW ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE PARADIGM
Aside from Justice Kennedy's willingness to join the Court's remaining
separationists in enforcing a broad view of religious coercion in public school cases, the
future looks bleak for the proponents of the Madisonian perspective on the Establishment
Clause. What avenues are left for the defenders of religious dissent once the Court's
new majority renounces the view that the government should be a secular entity,
announces that the religious majority can incorporate its views into law and its symbols
and invocations into official ceremonies and activities, and strips away all constitutional
standards that in any way effectively protect religious dissenters from the pervasive
imposition of the majority's faith? The answer is: precious little. Those attempting to
defend the religious minority from the religious majority under the new regime would
seem to have only three options.
The first option is to try to put some content into the concept of coercion.
The problem with this option is that the narrow coercion analysis that the new majority
will utilize outside the school context will almost never come into play with regard to
any governmental program written with the assistance of a legal staff. In the new era it
will be very easy for government to avoid imposing an overt legal sanction (which is the
only way to violate the narrow coercion analysis), while still effectively advancing the
religious interests of the political majority. It is frankly difficult to fathom how anything
short of an actual legal mandate to attend church would violate the narrow coercion
analysis. Any attempt to rely on the narrow coercion analysis to prevent governmental
impositions on the religious liberty of dissenters is unlikely to succeed.
One way in which the existence of a narrow coercion limit on government
advancement of religion may have an indirect impact on religious liberty litigation is
through a requirement that individuals be allowed to opt out of any
government-sponsored religious exercise. This opt-out requirement could be important
in several different contexts. In the endorsement context, the Constitution should
mandate that adults be allowed to opt out of any religious component of official
ceremonies. The Court has already implicitly assumed that adults have the right to opt
out of such exercises by noting that adults in such circumstances are "not readily
susceptible to 'religious indoctrination,' or peer pressure." 16 1 That assumption should be
made an explicit constitutional mandate, in the sense that in the absence of an opt-out
161. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 (upholding officially sanctioned prayer in a state legislature) (citations omitted).
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right, the government is in effect forcing the participant to engage in a religious exercise
on pain of giving up the right to participate in government activities-which looks like
the coercion of religious orthodoxy "by force of law and threat of penalty." 
16 2
An even more important application of the opt-out requirement would be in the
growing area of faith-based educational and social services. The government should be
required to provide an opt-out in such programs in order to avoid direct coercion of
religion in government-financed religious educational and social service programs.
In the broad form of this argument, the government should be obligated to give aid
recipients the option of receiving social services or educational benefits from an equally
convenient and qualified secular provider. In the narrow form of this argument, the
First Amendment should require the religious provider of government financed services
to provide a mechanism for aid recipients to opt out of any religious component of the
program. 163  If protecting the religious independence of aid recipients is a foremost
concern, the narrow form of the opt-out argument will be far less satisfactory than the
broad form of the argument, in the sense that the narrow form of the argument would
allow the government to force some aid recipients to submit to a pervasively religious
atmosphere in order to receive the benefits to which they are entitled. Nevertheless,
some form of an opt-out requirement can be viewed as a logical extension of the narrow
coercion standard, and in fact may be the only remaining protection under that standard.
A third option for protecting religious liberty under the new Establishment Clause
paradigm is to abandon attempts to enforce the Establishment Clause altogether and
focus instead on attempting to enforce the protections of religious dissenters under the
Free Exercise Clause. There are several problems with this approach. The main
problem is that the Free Exercise Clause is far less protective today than it was a decade
ago. Under Employment Division v. Smith, 164 the Free Exercise Clause does not prevent
the government from applying to religious practitioners a "'valid and neutral law of
general applicability."' 165  The Court may apply such laws even in the absence of a
compelling interest to support the law. 166  This concept of "general applicability"
contains a neutrality requirement that, in its free exercise form, takes the form of an
anti-discrimination principle. As the Court summarized the rule in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah:167 "[I]if the object of a law is to infringe upon or
restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral, and it is
162. Lee, 505 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, White, Thomas, JJ. & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
163. For a consideration of the opt-out requirement in the context of various different types of government
aid programs, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Sites of Redemption: A Wide-Angle Look at Government
Vouchers and Sectarian Service Providers, 18 J.L. & Pol. 539, 575-83 (2002). In the educational context,
the Cleveland voucher program upheld by the Court in Zelman did not include an opt-out provision.
See Zelman, 536 U.S. 639. The statute authorizing a similar program in Wisconsin prohibiting private schools
receiving government funds "from requiring 'a student attending the private school under this section to
participate in any religious activity if the pupil's parent or guardian submits to the teacher or the private
school's principal a written request that the pupil be exempt from such activities."' Jackson v. Benson,
578 N.W.2d 602, 609 (Wis. 1998).
164. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
165. Id. at 879 (quoting U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n. 3 (1982)).
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invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance
that interest."
' 16 8
The question is whether this anti-discrimination principle can be used to challenge
legislation adopted under the new, lenient Establishment Clause principle that the
government has the authority to act in ways that advance a particular brand of religion.
The answer is almost certainly "no." Governmental actions that endorse religion or
finance religious activities and institutions do not target specific actions of the
nonadherent or the nonreligious in ways that would bring those actions within the scope
of the Free Exercise Clause. The spirit of such actions is largely indistinguishable from
the spirit of the City of Hialeah's attacks on the Santerian practitioners in Hialeah,
169
but in the absence of specific legislation targeting specific acts of the disfavored religious
groups, the Free Exercise Clause will be just as useless as the empty husk of the
Establishment Clause.
V. CONCLUSION
One of the surprising things about the proponents of the new Establishment Clause
paradigm is how honest they have been about their objectives. In earlier attacks on the
concept of separation of church and state-which is the cornerstone of the existing
Establishment Clause paradigm-the argument was that the separation principle
inhibited the religious liberty of the faithful, and therefore should be abandoned in favor
of a regime in which the government may openly and willingly accommodate
religion. 170 Under the more recent attempts to defend the new paradigm, however, the
pretense of universal religious liberty has been dropped. The new rationale for
abandoning the separationist ideal is an unabashed claim that the religious majority
should have the authority to use the government to advance its interests though both
official endorsements of its symbols and ideals, as well as government financing of its
sectarian activities. Likewise, the mechanism for pursuing this end has gone beyond
simple accommodation, in favor of a theory that would allow the government to advance
the religious majority's goals outright.
From a purely self-interested perspective, only someone who is certain that they
will always belong to the religious majority would sensibly advocate the sort of
extensive government entwinement with religion proposed by the new Establishment
Clause paradigm. The campaign for the new paradigm is advanced primarily by
Christians, whose religious institutions will undoubtedly enjoy the fruits of their legal
successes for the indefinite future. Under the new paradigm, the government is likely to
become even more imbued with Christian ideals than it already is. Assuming that the
recipients of government aid will mirror the numbers of adherents in society, the new
streams of government funds that will soon be available to religious organizations will
also-at least for the immediate future-largely operate to finance activities associated
with various Christian sects.
168. Id. at 533.
169. See id at 524-28.
170. See Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim That Religious Arguments Should Be
Excludedfrom Democratic Deliberation, 1999 Utah L. Rev. 639, 640-41 (1999).
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But the country is not standing still, and religious demographics are rapidly
shifting. It is difficult to foresee what the country will look like in fifty years.
The largest "religious" group in the western states is now comprised of people who say
they are nonreligious. 17 1 Meanwhile, the fastest growing organized religious sect in the
country is Islam-which has its own millenarian adherents and many now-familiar
fundamentalist strains that could use extra sources of government funds to help them
grow. 172 At the same time, the nature of Christian religious worship is itself being
changed by the migration of adherents away from a traditional form of devotion to a
particular sect and toward a "consumerist" grazing among generic megachurches.
17 3
For the foreseeable future, the country's traditional organized Christian sects will benefit
from the elimination of barriers to using the government for their own ends. But it does
not take much imagination tq understand that their descendants may live to regret their
current victories.
171. See ARIS Survey, supra n. 63, at ex. 15, http://www.gc.cuny.edu/faculty/research-briefs/aris/
key findings.htm.
172. According to the ARIS Survey, the number of individuals identifying themselves as Muslim grew 209%
from 1990 to 2001, while during the same period the number of individuals identifying themselves as members
of a Christian sect only grew approximately 5%, and the number identifying themselves as Jews actually went
down approximately 10%. Id. at ex. 1, http://www.gc.cuny.edu/faculty/research-briefs/aris/keyfindings.htm.
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